An unanswered question about the final shape of Sarbanes-Oxley is why its criminal provisions focus on penalties rather than investigative and prosecutorial resources.
the Sentencing Commission passed the so-called Economic Crime Package, a set of guidelines amendments effective in November 2001 that completely overhauled the sentencing of economic crime offenses. This package was the product of more than five years of careful study, consultation, and negotiation among the Commission, judges, probation officers, defense counsel, and the Department of Justice.
The November 2001 Economic Crimes package significantly increased sentences for serious high-loss economic criminals, while holding steady, or in some cases slightly reducing, guideline levels for medium to low loss offenders. Thus, when corporate scandal began dominating the news in early 2002, the Sentencing Commission was ahead of the curve. It had already dealt with the problem of unduly low sentences for serious economic offenders..Andi when Congress began to hold hearings.in June 2002, those of us familiar with the Commission's work were able to go to Capital Hill and testify that sentences for serious white collar offenses had just been raised to quite satisfactory levels, and that no additional changes were required.3 Indeed, the Justice Department itself took this position in June 2002 (though they did express concern about low-loss offenders).4 What was needed, everyone agreed, was an increase in investigative and prosecutorial resources.
There the matter rested until, on July 9, President Bush made his Wall Street speech. The next day, DOJ began calling for increased sentences for corporate criminals (although in those early days they spoke in terms of increasing statutory maximum sentences, not guidelines ranges).5 Congressmen of both parties decided that they must be seen to be doing something punitive about crime in the suites. Legislation such as Senator Leahy's S.2oIo, which had passed the Senate but gained no traction in the House, was revived. 6 Other proposals to raise penalties were spawned. And so, within less than three weeks, the idea of increasing white collar crime sentences went from a dead issue to a central focus of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
In the end, Sarbanes-Oxley's criminal sections created some new niche crimes (e.g., covering destruction of documents and audit records), raised statutory maximum sentences for offenses like wire and mail fraud, and suggested or mandated a few specific guideline changes aimed at high-level corporate offenders. 7 An unanswered question about the final shape of Sarbanes-Oxley is why its criminal provisions focus on penalties rather than investigative and prosecutorial resources. Although the bill did increase funding somewhat for the chronically understaffed SEC, the Justice Department received no new money. Why, given the expressed satisfaction of the Justice Department with penalty levels and given the consensus that increased resources, not higher penalties, were called for, did Congress not allocate far more money for enforcement?
Perhaps the Administration was unwilling to advocate large budget increases for white collar crime fighting when it was diverting existing resources to anti-terrorism work. Or perhaps the explanation is that increasing criminal penalties in the way Sarbanes-Oxley did had several political advantages. Raising penalties makes good copy, but costs relatively little money, so long as the penalty increases take the form of increased statutory maxima which alter no actual sentences, rather than guidelines amendments which add real years for real defendants. Likewise, for those legislators who felt the need to be seen to be doing something, but who also understood that the Commission had already acted, Sarbanes-Oxley permitted chest-pounding press releases about being tough on crime without materially disrupting the accommodations reached in the 2ooi Economic Crime Package. Finally, a cynic might speculate that casting the corporate scandals of 2002 as primarily criminal episodes relieved pressure for even stronger civil regulatory action. At least some legislators may have thought that imposing extraordinary prison terms on a few crooked or unlucky CEOs was preferable to seriously revising the way in which big business governs itself and reports on its performance.
Whatever congressional motives may have been, the hastily drafted structure and imprecise language of Sarbanes-Oxley's criminal sections opened the door to creative interpretation. The Justice Department, which in June 2002 had pronounced itself happy with the Economic Crime Package, in October 2002 discovered in Sarbanes-Oxley a mandate from Congress to the. Commission to increase economic crime sentences on both corporate bigwigs and ordinary middle and low level fraud and theft defendants. DOJ proposed both specific enhancements for characteristically corporate crime, and a loss table amendment significantly increasing sentences for every defendant sentenced under Section 2BI.i who caused a loss greater than $io,ooo.' Interestingly, the Department never tried very hard to explain why sentences under the 2ooi Economic Crime Package for serious economic criminals were inadequate.9 Their argument throughout was that Sarbanes-Oxley required the Commission to raise all economic crime sentences. To some observers, the most notable aspect of the Department's change of heart was not that it saw a political opportunity in Sarbanes-Oxley to argue for more sentence increases. In all administrations, the natural (if perhaps regrettable) disposition of prosecutors is to seek higher sentences. Most striking was the Justice Department's express and often-repeated threat to go back to Congress for even more explicit and draconian penalty language if the Commission did not acquiesce in its demand for across-the-board sentence increases.-After much difficult and impassioned debate, the Commission passed emergency amendments in January 2003 targeted at high-end corporate offenders, followed by a second set of amendments in May 2003 that added one base offense level for any defendant convicted of a theft or fraud crime carrying a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years or more (primarily offenses such as wire and mail fraud for which Congress raised statutory maxima in Sarbanes-Oxley). Given the political landscape, this outcome can fairly be described as admirably restrained. Nonetheless, for high-loss defendants in corporate crimes, the cumulative effect of the 20oi Economic Crime Package and the 2003 Sarbanes-Oxley amendments will produce sentences measured in decades. And the apparently insignificant one-baseoffense-level increase for fraud offenders will preclude probationary, home or community confinement, or split sentences for thousands of low-loss defendants. 
